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STUDENT NOTES
WILLS-THE NATURE OF NON-TESTAMENTARY ACTS
A non-testamentary act is an unattested act which determines or
affects either the amount of a legacy or devise or the identity of the
legatee or devisee, but whose primary purpose is other than affecting
the will, that is, not testamentary.
The acts may be divided into those affecting legacies or devises and
those affecting legatees or devisees, but if we are to arrive at the nature
of the act it is more purposeful to divide them into those acts involving
writing and those which do not. The validity of the latter is not as
questionable as the validity of the former.
A numerous class is that involving a bequest to the person or
persons who shall take care of the testator in his last days. There are
many variations of this. Bequests to employees or servants are univer-
sally held good, the only controversy being as to what persons are
included by the terms of the will.2 A bequest to a "business partner"
was held good.2 In all of these the doing of a certain act completes or
gives effect to a testamentary provision but the act is not performed
for that purpose. The testator hires a servant for the purpose of having
that person serve him and not because he wants to benefit him by his
will. In the same way one would not select a business partner for the
sole purpose of allowing him to take under a will, but because he wants
that person as a business partner. Each of these acts could be per-
formed with testamentary intent in disregard of the immediate tem-
poral effect, but it is so unlikely that the courts do not even discuss it.
Could the testator with a provision in his will for servants employ a
person with the sole intention that he might be benefited by the will
without requiring any services? The writer thinks not. In the first
place, It is almost inconceivable that a person would act in that way
when it would be so much easier to change the will, and in the second
place, the courts would probably recognize it as testamentary and not
allow it. Most of the provisions require something besides mere
I "No case has been found in which the validity of a devise or
bequest has been questioned on the ground that it was to 'servants',
'employees', or the like instead of to named persons, but numerous
cases have considered the question of who may take under such a pro-
vision." Note, 38 A- L. R. 779.
2 Abbott v. Lewis, 77 N. H. 94, 88 A. 98 (1913); Metcalf v. Sweeney,
17 R. I. 215, 21 Atl. 364 (1S91); Ginter's Executors v. Shelton, 102 Va.
185, 45 S. E. 892 (1903); Industrial Trust Co. v. Alves, 46 R. I. 16,
124 AtI. 260 (1924); Givens v. Whitney, 233 N. Y. 665 (1922); In re
Mitchell's Estate, 114 Misc. 370, 186 N. Y. S. 666 (1921); In re Altman's
Estate, 115 Misc. 476, 188 N. Y. S. 493 (1921); 1 Page on Wills 1518-19,
Sec. 911.
Stubbs v. Sargon, 3 M. & C. 507, 40 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1838).
KENTUCKY LAW JounNAL
employment, usually a certain length of time, so it would be, to say
the least, a most uncertain opening for a non-testamentary act.
When the will provides that those who take care of the testator in
his last days shall take part of the estate, usually there is no writing
involved.4 It takes the concurrence of the testator's and the beneficiary's
acts to identify the beneficiary. Both could be performed with testa-
mentary intent. The testator may arrange for a person to care for
him principally with the intent of naming the beneficiary of his will.
But it takes something besides the intent-the care must actually
be given. If the person giving the care knows of the will provision,
he may give that care with the principal intent of taking under a will,
but caring for a person is of such a nature that the primary intent
must be giving care and cannot be benefiting from a will. Since this
is true, it was properly held that one who took care of the testatrix
at her request with full knowledge of the will provision, took under the
provision.5 The provision in the will was that the care should be
furnished at the request of the testatrix, and in the request to her
granddaughter the testatrix even said that she wanted the grand-
daughter to have all her property. This case probably goes to the
extreme. It is an illustration that an act may be partly testamentary
and still valid as non-testamentary. In one caseG the testatrix told her
attorney that she intended for her stepdaughter to have her property
under a provision that it should go to whomsoever should take care
of her. This evidence was not admitted as it was clearly shown that a
charitable organization and not her stepdaughter had really taken care
of her. The act cannot be entirely testamentary. What little objection
there has been to this type of provision in wills is not that it allows a
later testamentary act to change the will, but because of uncertainty
and the admission of parol evidenceY It makes no difference that the
care is to be for someone other than the testator 8
The non-testamentary acts involving writing are more difficult to
explain. One is that involving advancements, or satisfactions.' The
testator provides that all advancements to the beneficiaries appearing
4 Lear v. Manser, 114 Me. 342, 96 At. 240 (1916); In re Reinheimer's
Estate, 42 R. I. 408, 108 Atl. 419 (1919).
'Dennis v. Holsapple, 148 Ind. 297, 47 N. E. 631 (1897).
"In re Mangan's Will, 185 Wisc. 328, 200 N. W. 386 (1924).
1 Bosserman v. Burton, 137 Va. 502, 120 S. E. 261 (1923) (Contention
that the provision was void for uncertainty but it was held good); In re
Farmer's Will, 163 N. Y. S. 1089 (1917); Summers v. Summers, 102
Va. 185, 73 S. E. 401 (1916).
8 Harriman v. Harriman, 59 N. H. 135 (1879).
'Langdon v. Astor's Executors, 16 N. Y. 9 (1857); King v. Lynch,
74 N. C. 364 (1876); In re Twombly, 24 Misc. 51, 53 N. Y. S. 385 (1898);
In re Moore, 61 N. J. Eq. 616, 47 Atl. 731 (1900); Robert v. Corning, 89
N. Y. 225 (1882); Lawrence v. Lindsay, 68 N. Y. 108 (1877); Shaw v.
Grimes, 187' Ky. 250, 218 S. W. 447 (1919). Evans, Incorporation by
Reference, Integration, and Non Testamentary Act, 25 Col. L. PL 879,
893 (1925). Advancement is incorrect technically but it is the most
convenient term as it is used in the will provisions themselves.
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on his account book shall be charged against their legacies. The writing
of the amount in the account is done expressly to affect the size of the
legacy. It seems at first glance that we are allowing the testator to
change his will by a subsequent unattested writing, but it is held to be
non-testamentary. Advancements do not change the gift in the will
but are only the paying of part of it before the death of the testator.
The testator may make gifts without regard to his will.10 It is quite
proper for him to make known which gift he wants to be considered
part of the gift in the will. This he does by writing it in his account
book. The writing is considered part of the non-testamentary advance-
ment and so is itself non-testamentary." If it were only evidence of the
advancement, the only controlling feature would be the intention of
the testator. It has been held that a writing which amounts only to
the striking of a balance and is not made until some time after the
advancement is actually made is admissable to show the testator's
purpose to treat the gifts as advancements if they were in fact made."
It would seem more desirable to only allow the admission of a writing
which is made at the time of the advancement and so is an integral
part of it. A writing made some time later would only be valid if the
testator at the time of making the gift actually had the intention to
treat it as an advancement Of course, it would be practically im-
possible to discover the actual intent of the testator at the time, but a
writing made at the time would be better evidence than one made
later. It is submitted that it should be the only evidence since it is
actually a part of the advancement. It is consistently held that the
writing is not conclusive and there must be advancements in fact.
L3
This problem is very closely related to incorporation by reference and
'"Webster v. Gray, 7 N. Y. S. 266, 268 (1889) (T, who stated in
will that amount charged in books should be treated as advancements,
may enter memorandum in the account of settlement in full. Power
to dispose of property in his lifetime not limited by any previously
indicated testamentary provision.)
" "In my judgment, the paper which contained the charge is not to
be regarded as testamentary in character." In re Moore, 61 N. J. Eq.
616, 47 Atl. 731, 732 (1900).
'-'McClintock's Appeal, 58 Mich. 152, 24 N. W. 549 (1885).
I' "It cannot be presumed that the testator intended that an entry
should pay a legacy, unless it expressed the fact. Besides if the testator
so intended, it is doubtful whether such a provision would be valid."
Lawrence v. Lindsay, 68 N. Y. 108, 114 (1877); "We do not here hold
that the mere act of charging a sum as an advancement done by the
testator after the making of a will is of effect." In re Harris' Estate,
82 Vt. 199, 72 Atl. 912, 915 (1909); "Hence the charge in the book goes
for nothing if it be shown to be untrue; or that the subject matter of it
had not been actually given or advanced to the party charged with it."
Hoak v. Hoak, 5 Watts 80, 82 (Pa. 1837); but see Musselman's Estate,
5 Watts 9, 13 Pa. 1837), "He might, doubtless, have peremptorily
directed the book, in whatever condition found at his death to be taken
for conclusive proof of the state of the accounts"; In re Weil's Will
151 Misc. 841, 272 N. Y. S. 477 (1934) (Testator provided that charges
should be conclusive evidence of the fact of indebtedness and of the
account but no comment was made upon this provision by the court).
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it would be well to note one important distinction. When the statement
of accounts is spoken of as already existing and so incorporated by
reference, the amounts stated are conclusive.1
4 An important reason
for distinguishing between the two is that some states which do not
allow incorporation by reference do recognize the efficacy of non-testa-
mentary acts.1
Suppose that the testator should provide that those assuming
certain positions after the execution of his will whose names he should
write down, would take under his will, for example, those who should
take care of him and whose names he should write in a particular
place should be beneficiaries. It has been rightly held that a testator
cannot provide that such of his already existing creditors whose names
he shall later write down may take under his will.8 But could he
provide that such of his after-acquired creditors whose names he should
write down should take? Such a provision would be good if these cases
are analogous to the cases of advancements. The assumption of the
position is non-testamentary and if the act of writing the names is a
part of that, it is also non-testamentary. The act of writing down the
amount is more a natural part of an advancement than writing down
a name is of having a person occupy a certain position. In the leading
case of Langdon v. Astor's Executors1 the writing down was said to
have been made in the course of business. If this is the rationale
behind the advancement cases it could not apply to our hypothetical
cases and the provisions would not be good. It is a method of selecting
which under certain non-testimentary acts shall benefit from a will, and
since the selection is entirely for the purpose of designating legatees,
it is testamentary and void.
Another type of non-testamentary act involving writing is the
designation of the beneficiary thru another person's will.
8 In one
caseP9 the testator left some property to his daughter and in case of her
death in his lifetime to her executors. The provision was held good.
This case was the basis for the decision in the much discussed In re
Fowles' Wi,20 in which the testator provided that in case he and his
wife died under such circumstances that it was impossible to tell which
one predeceased the other, it should be deemed that he predeceased his
wife. The effect of this was that his estate should go according to his
wife's will, and it was held good. These wills are testamentary as to
the writer's property but not as the property of the testator, who
refers to them as means of identifying his beneficiaries, and so properly
14 In re Well's Estate, 184 Wise. 242, 199 N. W. 52 (1924).
,- The state of New York is a notable example.
Hartwell v. Martin, 71 N. J. Eq. 157, 63 Atl. 754 (1906).
1116 N. Y. 9 (1857).
'sEvans, op. cit. supra note 9, 898.
"In re Piffard's Estate, 111 N. Y. 410, 18 N. E. 718 (1888).
'222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918). For discussions of the case
see 27 Y. L. J. 673 (1918); 3 Corn L. Q. 320 (1918); Evans, op. cit.
svpra note 9, 899, 900.
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fall under the heading of non-testamentary acts. If the will is already
in existence at the time and referred to as such, it is incorporated by
reference." That this is possible is obvious, but it does not follow that
if the writing can be incorporated by reference, it must be, and so if
Incorporation by reference is not recognized, the provision is not
allowed to stand under the doctrine of non-testamentary acts. In other
words if the non-testamentary act has already been performed at the
time the will is made, it is not good.? Thus it would appear that the
non-testamentary act must be performed after the will is made even
tho it may be non-testamentary before that time. In Condit v. DeHart
the testator left property to the person whom his son might designate
by his will as the one to whom it might go. The son died first, designat-
ing his wife. It was held that the property passed to the wife but
under the father's will. It is submitted that this is wrong when
looked upon as a non-testamentary act, because the whole purpose of
the son's designating his wife as the person to have the estate was for
the sole purpose that she might take the father's estate and no other.
In the other cases discussed the beneficiaries were not named for that
one purpose but that they might be beneficiaries of the will in which
they were named.
The cases involving trusts are very similar to the will cases. The
trust deed is written and its purpose is the disposition of property. In
one case the testator left property to a trust fund over which he had
the power to change the beneficiaries after the will was made. The
amount already in the fund was much larger than that to be added to
it by the will. It was held that the bequest was void because of the
testator's power over the trust. This decision seems to be wrong
because any act of the testator altering the trust would be primarily
for the purpose of affecting the property already in the trust. In the
words of the dissenting opinion it would be "of business nature" and
have "reason for its existence apart from any disposition of the
property under the will".? When there can be no incorporation by
reference, a bequest to the trustee of a trust fund is valid even tho
there must be a reference to the trust agreementn and a bequest to a
specified person under the same terms as a certain trust agreement is
also validY The trust is distinct and definite and capable of identifica-
tion. The establishment of the trust is a non-testamentary act.
21 Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 173, 146 N. E. 277 (1925).
2Keil v. Hoehn, 72 Misc. 255, 131 N. Y. S. 39 (1911). But see In re
Barlow's Will, 144 Misc. 210, 253 N. Y. S. 451 (1932). Here the New
York court uses language indicating a tendency to adopt incorporation
by reference when the holding of the case is perfectly correct under
the doctrine of non-testamentary acts.
'62 N. J. L. 200, 40 AtI. 776 (1893).
"Atwood v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1921).
zAtwood v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co. 275, Fed. 513, 538 (1921).
r Swetland v. Swetland, 100 N. J. Eq. 196, 134 Atl. 822 (1926).
-"In re Rausch's Will, 179 N. B. 755, 258 N. Y. 327, 30 A. L. R.
98 (1932).
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A border line case is In re Gibbon,'s Estate in which the testator
provided that any checks outstanding at his death should be treated as
valid claims against his estate and paid by his executor. The provision
was held to be invalid. Writing checks is disposing of property, but
it is not disposing of property after death. The fact that they are out-
standing is not deliberate, but purely a matter of chance. The reasoning
of the court was that they were testamentary since neither names nor
amounts were mentioned in the will. But if there can be a valid gift
without one, there might just as well be a valid gift without both. In
the cases involving wills neither the beneficiary nor the amount is
given. The method of identification is just as proper when applied to
both as to one.
In conclusion, provision for subsequent acts whose only reason for
existence is the disposition of property after death is not valid because
the acts are testamentary and unattested and so invalid.? The identifi-
cation as the result of the acts must be reasonably certain.' It is not
necessary that the act be absolutely devoid of testamentary intent, but
probably the principal reason for its performance should be non-
testamentary. Bs'r'rm GILnBET
ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS AND THE KENTUCKY WORKMAN'S
COMPENSATION BOARD
The increasing complexities of government have caused the develop-
ment in comparatively recent years of a new type of governmental
unit-the administrative body.' It was discovered that a government
operating upon a classical separation of powers was unable to cope
adequately with the new demands upon government 2
To this new type of body, created by the legislative branch, were
intrusted functions, legislative, judicial, and executive, to enable it to
act with the requisite efficiency. The advantage of such bodies became
readily apparent-they acted speedily, informally, and rapidly became
exper.
1139 Misc. 658, 249 N. Y. S. 753 (1931).
'Thomas v. Anderson, 245 Fed. 642 (1917); In re Perry's Will, 125
Misc. 616, 214 N. Y. S. 461 (1926).
' BEarly v. Arnold, 119 Va. 500, 89 S. E. 900 (1916).
"Administrative tribunals, often spoken of as bureaus, boards or
commissions, did not come because anyone wanted them to come. They
came because there seemed to be no other practical way of carrying on
the affairs of government and discharging the duties and obligations
which an increasingly complex social organization made it necessary
for the government to perform." Rosenberg, Administrative Law and
the Constitution (1929) 23 American Political Science Review 32.
- "It is a common-place that the exigencies of effective administra-
tion permit little more than lip service to the classic notion that all
government activity should be chopped into blocks and handed out,
like Gaul, to three separate custodians." Hyneman, Administrative
Adjudication: An Analysis (1936) 51 Pol. Science Quart. 383.
'"The ideal which has been presented in justification of these new
administrative agencies ... is the ideal of specific knowledge, flexibility,
